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remove the offender himself from ordinary social life. It is only on offenders whose biological and social condition is almost normal that the prison has any appreciable effect for good. On the multitude of abnormally constituted and abnormally circumstanced offenders, I am convinced, from long and watchful experience, that the prison has only an effect for evil. Imprisonment for short terms in its present shape neither does the offender nor the society which imprisons him any good whatever. It is in fact one of those forms of punishment which an eminent ethical teacher says he personally regards with the strongest moral aversion.

I have not come among you to-night to propose remedies, but to lay bare causes. I have no cut-and-dried remedy for social ills. I do not believe that such a remedy exists. But as to-day is the anniversary of the death of one of our greatest contemporary moralists,—Thomas Carlyle,—I will conclude by reminding you of the remedy proposed by his immortal master. “If each one,” says Goethe, “does his duty as an individual, and if each one works rightly in his own vocation, then it will be well with society as a whole.”

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

THE TELEOLOGY OF VIRTUE.

MOST ethical systems agree in regarding virtue as teleological in that it secures by its own intrinsic properties the highest good of man. How virtue is connected with this well-being; whether or not it is in itself the ultimate end of action, is a question on which, as we shall see, there is a wide difference of opinion. Yet there is a general consensus of belief that either virtue and human well-being are identical, or the two are related as end and means.

Such a view has not been invariably accepted. It has sometimes been thought that it is more honoring to God to represent the moral law as the expression of His arbitrary will. God has given us the moral precepts we have, but He might have given others. It is our part as His creatures to obey

the laws we have received, and it would have been equally our part to obey any others He might have imposed, however different in quality they might be. Rewards may be given by God, but the same rewards might as well follow any kind of conduct. Virtue is not causally connected with welfare; or it is so only through its relation to this foreign power. This view, which had as its champions such thinkers as Duns Scotus and William of Occam, was a natural intellectual product of the mediæval church. It is scarcely to be reconciled with Christianity; but the mediæval church had relapsed largely into Judaism. It is a natural part of any doctrine which lays too great emphasis on the article of the Divine Sovereignty.

Modern systems of ethics show a more or less complete break with such theological conceptions. That these have been entirely discarded, it would be too much to aver; but the tendency is away from them. In Idealistic systems human reason has been identified with the divine. The spirit of God and the spirit of man are said to be akin, and therefore the moral law is not regarded as an arbitrary enactment of the Supreme Being. While it reflects the divine holiness, it appears at the same time to man as his own legislation, and in obeying it he is realizing his own best nature. Even Kant, who more than any other may be regarded as unwilling to sacrifice anything of the unconditional authority of moral law, finds the source of that authority in our reason, and thus makes virtue man's obedience to himself.

The teleological nature of virtue has been yet more explicitly asserted by those who hold that pleasure is the end of life. To them the term good has no meaning, except as denoting a distinctly human good; and virtue belongs to actions only as they conduce to this good. Idealists and Hedonists are thus agreed that human welfare is the end of moral action.

But when it is asked wherein human welfare consists, the divergence in view already indicated is found to stand for a hitherto unreconciled antagonism. The Idealists and Intuitionists make prominent the part of Reason in the constitu-

tion of the true good. According to Kant, the Practical Reason utters its precepts for the direction of the crowd of desires and impulses found in man's nature. The relation of the Practical Reason to these is analogous to the relation of the Intellect to the data of sense. As, in the realm of cognition, thought brings order into the chaos of sensations, disposing them into a cosmos, so into the world of passion reason comes to legislate, with an authority derived not from the material on which it acts, but from itself. The good life is not in the gratification of any natural desire, but in the controlling of that desire by reason.

Professor T. H. Green taught likewise that the ethical life of man consists in the control of his appetites and other powers by reason. To what does reason order the faculties? To the pleasure which satisfies desire? No; its end is to realize itself in them, to exercise them for the sake of exercising them well. The categorical imperative enjoins only disinterested obedience to itself. The unconditional good is the good will. The good will is likewise the will for the unconditional good, and if there seems to be movement in a circle, the circle is that of the ethical life.

Similar is the view presented by Mr. Muirhead in his "*Elements of Ethics*."* "The end of life is an ideal of self; but the ideal self cannot be realized in the pleasant consciousness which follows the satisfaction of desire; but in the subordination of the desires according to the law of the self as an organic unity."

These theories agree in making the rational the end of life. The reason guides the other elements in human nature, and this guidance is the ideal or end. As was said of old, we shoot, not that the mark may be struck, but that we may show skill in shooting.

The Hedonistic opponents of such theories find in feeling with its poles of pleasure and pain the rationale of the ethical life. They start from the obvious fact that we desire pleasure and have an aversion to pain. This is taken to represent the

ultimate principle of all action. All action has as its end human welfare, by welfare pleasure being meant. Virtuous action is action that is wise.

In Bentham's view, pleasures varied in quantity only, not in quality; and the end of life was, consequently, the greatest sum of pleasures. J. S. Mill, however, maintains that pleasures vary in quality as well as quantity; there are higher pleasures as well as lower. Still the theory, even in this more attractive form, is defective, and Mr. Spencer offers to correct and supplement it. Mill had not explained why we have such and such pleasures; he had given no genesis of the moral faculties. He had also failed to show how these faculties are inter-related. Spencer believed that he supplied such an explanation and unifying principle in his use of the conception of evolution. He teaches that, at the beginning of animal life, the securing of pleasure takes place in simple ways. But, as life develops, there is in the method of accomplishing this an increasing complexity. The end is not something immediately attained, and there is a more elaborate adjustment of means or actions necessary for the securing of the end. The simplest living forms absorb the food with which they are brought into contact. But the more developed beast of prey gains its food in no such direct way. "Before the gullet swallows, the jaws must lay hold; before the jaws tear out a piece fit for swallowing, there must be that co-operation of limbs and senses required for killing the prey; before this there must be persistent activities of limbs, eyes, and nose in seeking prey."* There is still more to be said of these subsidiary activities. They come to be attended by pleasure irrespective of the end which they were meant to serve. There is a pleasure in the search for prey as well as in the satisfaction of appetite. Similarly in human life there are the pleasures of business which are distinct from the pleasures of food and clothing, though these ultimately prompt the merchant's energy. The good of life can thus be said to be in its fullness,—*i.e.*, in the pleasures which are immediately and directly

* "Data of Ethics," § 58.

pursued, and those which attend the actions done with a view to ulterior ends. Under the head of means are to be classed those activities which are known more distinctly as moral. The ultimate sanction of moral action is in those pleasures which were the original cause of activity. While "to use effectually each more complex set of means becomes the proximate end, and the accompanying feeling becomes the immediate gratification sought, there may be, and habitually is, an associated consciousness of the remoter ends and remoter gratifications to be obtained."* More explicitly Mr. Spencer says, "Is it not clear that observance of moral principles is fulfilment of certain general conditions to the successful carrying on of special activities. . . . May we not infer that though conformity to moral requirements precedes in imperativeness conformity to other requirements; yet that this imperativeness arises from the fact that fulfilment of the other requirements is thus furthered."* When we inquire further what these primal requirements are, they seem to resolve themselves into some such pleasures as those of food-taking. It is extremely important that it should be clearly understood that this is the meaning of Mr. Spencer's theory.

The teaching of Mr. Stephen is similar. We learn from him that the reason of conduct is always its quality in terms of pain or pleasure. The kind of pleasure the agent seeks, depends on his character. His character, again, depends on the conditions of his existence. It must be such as to fit him for the struggle of life. Life here must mean physical life. Character is not the supreme end; it fits for life. It is scarcely a misrepresentation of the doctrine to interpret it as saying that the primary pleasure is either that of mere existence, or that of the sense of taste, and that the character and the pleasures thereon dependent are subordinate to it. It is only in agreement with this view of the end that Mr. Stephen makes the maxim, *Be strong*, the maxim of the individual virtues. The strength inculcated is evidently that which is requisite to the preservation of life.

* "Data of Ethics," § 59.

We have now before us the modes in which some of the leading ethical theories employ this conception of teleology. Though the category plays so important a part, a critical examination of it is looked for in vain. Vagueness of thought is the necessary consequence of this neglect of criticism, and there is need for an investigation to determine the value and limits of the conception. The investigation is essential to the formation of ethical theories; it has also, as we shall see, no unimportant bearing on ethical practice.

We may provisionally define human teleological action as voluntary action, the idea of which precedes the doing of it. We must, later, analyze such actions. We have also to determine how many kinds of action can be so described, and what the end of such actions is, more especially, what actions have pleasure as their motive. We have also to indicate how much of the ethical life has an origin independent of human will and purpose.

To start with the last-mentioned problem, it is to be observed that much in human life, including many of its most valuable elements, is not due to man's purposive action. The faculties with which he is endowed are not of his making. The power to perceive truth he did not call into being. His social instincts he did not create. His "random" movements are not volitional. Even his habits are only to a small extent a result of choice. It is, after all, to a comparatively small fraction of life that deliberate intention has application.

Our view of this matter would not be intrinsically modified were we to adopt the point of view of evolution. For while to the evolutionist the animal improves slowly towards the man, the improvement is not due to its design; scarcely, if at all, to its desires. Animals are born with finer endowments, but it was, of course, no design of theirs that such should be secured. Nature, we say, meaning a power other than the finite will familiar to us, brought into being that richer life. The genesis of the moral nature is only a chapter in this story. The origin of sympathy is not in design. The altruistic instincts were not arranged for. The family and other

institutions were made for men or their progenitors, rather than by them. It would scarcely be too much to say, whether we are evolutionists or not, that the beginnings of our ethical life and almost all its developments in intelligence as to ideals, are due to a power other than our wills. It is true that when we have tasted a good, we can labor to secure it. But we do not labor for it till it has been brought into our experience. Neither can we be said to wish for new forms of it unless there has first been an enlargement of our experience. It is an advanced reflection which would make experiments with life for the purpose of getting a larger satisfaction. And even in such cases the human attitude is that of receptiveness. The good is given to us, and is not of him that willeth. Our good gifts are from above.

How are these endowments of thought and instinct and habit related to the moral life? Are they a part of it? We would surely be justified in saying that they are. It is surely an improper limitation of the moral life which would restrict it to the conflict with evil. The good which is imperilled in the conflict is not necessarily more precious than that which is given in the exercise of habit and instinct, and natural mental gift. Whether this be allowed or not, these factors enter into our ethical life. Without them our ethical life would not exist.

What kind of relations these elements exhibit is a question we shall not here discuss at length. It may at least be said that they cannot be construed after ordinary human analogies of end and means.

When we pass to actions which originate with human wills, we find that an important class, representing no small part of human life, is composed of those which are the fruit of desire, though they do not embody any choice. Every idea of an action tends to project itself outwardly. The action is produced by its suggestion; the sight of means to do deeds makes the deeds done. Specially clear illustrations of this type of actions are afforded by those which result from the morbid persistence of the idea of them. A man throws himself over a precipice from the sheer dread of doing so. His

fear gives the thought of the suicide such vividness that nothing inhibits it. Of such "ideo-motor" actions the incipient stages may be called desire.

Such actions are teleological and voluntary in one sense. The idea of them precedes them; the performance of them is conscious; there may also be the selection of means necessary. Such actions may also have moral quality, for moral ideas can pass thus directly into deeds. Yet from such impulses choice is absent. There is no conscious self-reference; there is no selection from a number of possible states or activities of the self. The idea of the action, which is the action incipient, produces its overt realization. If there is teleology here, it is not in the deliberate purpose of human intelligence; it is in the necessities which govern the human mind; or, to put it physiologically, in the natural working of the nerve-cells. The protoplasm stimulated must act in some way; the cases considered have the peculiarity that the incipient action is itself the stimulus.

Again, actions may be done for pleasure. These are among the most familiar, as they are among the most significant, of the activities of organic beings. The study of them is beset by endless controversies. It may suffice here to consider what is in some respects the most important group of such pleasure-motivated actions, those which are done from choice. We shall see, as we proceed, whether this group includes all choices.

Choice is less wide than desire. It is that desire which has been in conflict with others, and has won the victory. In desire there is a contrast of two states, but the contrast is not necessarily present to consciousness. The present want and the future possession are elements in it, but there may be no reflection on the relations of the two. Where the contrast is present to consciousness there is choice. There are two states of the self thus contrasted, and selection between them is made. It is in respect to choice that the theory holds, which declares that in voluntary activity there is reference to a self.

What is the end of the actions which choice determines?

Is it always pleasure? Or, may it be a rational principle? Or, is it a combination of the two? At the outset, attention should be drawn to the ambiguity in the term choice. We say we choose the means to a given end; or, of two methods of accomplishing a task we choose the better. The expression is not objectionable, yet it should be observed that choice is here made to include a judgment on the qualities of things. But such a judgment has not choice proper in it any more than the judgment that a right angle is larger than an acute angle. Choice is present when we appropriate to ourselves that which is deemed good.

This is the true relation of intellect to choice. We have seen the claim of the Idealists that the ethical life is the realization of reason. The statement contains truth, but it cannot be accepted in the form in which it is presented. The impulse to moral action does not come directly from reason. For, in the first place, reason does not utter imperatives. To give to its dictates the form *Thou shalt*, is, it need not be remarked, to speak in a pictorial way. It is the function of the Reason to see truth. From this insight into truth an impulse to moral action may arise, but the two are distinct. The so-called imperative is more properly indicated by the expressions, feeling of obligation, sense of duty. It is approval of and delight in the good presented, a sentiment varying in its *Gefühlston* with all the variations in the quality and relations of the good, and possessing in presence of a rational conception of conduct that quality which we regard as having a peculiar sacredness. The impulse to action is not from reason. We have spoken, indeed, of ideas passing into overt action. But we can say this only because of the wide meaning of the term idea. In such an idea, *per se*, there is no judgment, there is no perception of relations; and if it is the work of the understanding to judge, or to indicate relations, that faculty must be declared to have no place in such ideas.

From this it can further be seen that it is not the function of reason to change man's nature. The theories referred to represent reason as acting on the various empirical elements

in human nature, and shaping and transforming them to suit its purpose. There is in this a good illustration of the mischief which follows failure to criticise categories. These theories present a conception of the activity of reason which has been gained by observation of a very different kind of activity. Reason does not struggle with the world. The term "practical Reason" is misleading. Reason contemplates the world. The business of changing belongs to animal life. Birds build nests; beasts of prey hunt and kill and eat; and man as resembling them has earring and harvest. The organism uses its environment; it changes it, and changes itself. But the peculiar activity of the organism does not represent the activity of reason. It is through emotion that the decisions of life are determined; when there is a conflict between two or more ideas, there must be appeal to this arbiter of the practical life. The will is the source of our deliberate acts; and the will is not reason. Hegel says that nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion. Professor A. Seth points to the fallacy lurking in the statement, that the world is governed by ideas. It might be more prudent to say that great things may be accomplished without passion, but that when the individual has to choose between two states or conditions of himself, he will accomplish nothing, either great or small, till passion has turned the scale. Feeling changes the world. The intellect makes no selections, but it is the part of feeling to choose. We prefer the pleasant, we shun the painful. While the intellect contemplates the laws which it discovers in the world, pleasure consumes the world, having as its one interest that the ministry to itself should be perfected.

It need scarcely be added that pleasure is various in quality. The self whose good we seek is not always the same self. There is the self as cognitive, as æsthetic, as social; and besides these and within these there is an indefinite number of gradations; and the feeling attendant on the idea of each is unique. Yet all such feelings have the general characteristic that they are part of that happiness which constitutes our well-being.

Choice is of the pleasant. Yet it is scarcely to be supposed that psychological analysis can stop at this result. It must further determine the meaning of this statement, by showing what elements enter into this consciousness of the ego and its pleasure. It seems to be the case that the feeling of the self is largely constituted by the so-called organic feelings. It is also the case that these organic feelings are in large measure emotional; it is their pleasure or pain qualities which we are aware of. So that when the Ego consciously identifies itself with the idea of an action it is meant, at least, in part, that the idea awakens the pleasurable feelings, and thus in turn receives a reinforcement which secures its realization. The basis of our life is emotional, and we can be said to be stirred to the core of our being only when our emotional nature is thus awakened. Only when thus stimulated do we choose. Appeal is made to the deep-seated primal emotions. How these blend with the other psychical elements, we need not wait to inquire.

It will conduce to greater clearness if two of the objections which can be brought against this doctrine be considered. On the one hand there may be urged the familiar *Meliora probo, deteriora sequor*. The drunkard believes that sobriety would secure him the finest enjoyment, yet he cannot refrain when the cup is near. In such a case there seems to be choice. Yet the poor victim of appetite knows how little choice there is. The idea of the indulgence is in presence of the temptation, too powerful and urgent for any other idea to have its legitimate influence. All other motives pale away. For choice, the various motives should be carefully weighed; but this is a requirement which it is impossible for the mind so enslaved to meet. The action thus, though there is in its initial stages the semblance of choice, resolves itself into one in which an action suggested has been realized.

On the other hand there are actions which seem to be done simply from obedience to moral law. In the crises of life, choice has its most important function, but the choice is not determined by pleasure. The action chosen is thought to

lose all moral value if pleasure has been its motive. Such actions must be examined more minutely. Obedience to the moral law may be the result of any one of many motives. There may be obedience from fear, or for reward. Most of these cases may be dismissed at once; it is not in them that the exception to the general rule can be found. The cases to be considered are those in which the moral law leads immediately to action. Yet it will be found that in them there is no illustration of choice. The law arrests attention; or, rather the idea of a concrete moral action does this. The idea gains ascendancy and passes into outward action. There is not reference to a self whose good is regarded as realized in moral activity. Were there such reference there would be choice of happiness. The action is more mechanical. It may be added that such actions do not display the highest type of morality. There is an irrational element in them. The moral law is obeyed without any understanding of its authority. The morality is mediæval, judaistic. If virtue is teleological, he is surely on a higher plane who understands the teleology and renders an obedience, not blind, but intelligent.

There is possible yet another account of the end of action. It may be a combination of reason and emotion; it is often the object as given in the vision of enjoyment which seems to excite our efforts. This view need not detain us long. It is so far correct. So far as we are rational, ideas mingle with all our experience; they are the best light to lighten human ways. But when we choose between two courses of action, it is not from them, so far as they are of reason, that the decision comes.

We have thus found many kinds of actions: those which are the natural exercises of the faculties; those which are random; those which are habitual; those which are preceded by their idea; and those which are done for pleasure including those which are the result of choice. It would be interesting to ethics, as to psychology, if they could be reduced to one type. That there is unity of type is suggested by a consideration of their physiological counterpart. It may be

that in all these cases we have repeated the functions of the nerve-cells, nutrition, and liberation of energy. Repeated, indeed, in different conditions, and varying with the varying environment and interrelations of the cells; yet ultimately similar; even pleasure-motivated actions can be reduced to this type.

It is not meant, indeed, that all actions are identical in nature: there is no such barren identity. But there seems to be enough to show that the teleological conception is subordinate. The final interpretation of life cannot be in its terms. But the question arises, Is all action to be explained on mechanical principles? We must beware of abstractions. The concrete material world is probably, in the essence of its working, not merely mechanical.

There is a further question awaiting us. The utilitarian value of the pleasure which is chosen must be determined. Mr. Spencer teaches not only that pleasure is the end of action, but that only those animals survived whose actions were useful towards self-preservation; and he finds the sanction of conduct in this utility.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of this utilitarian doctrine for the light which it throws on the organic relation of the virtues to life. It was natural that Mr. Spencer should ignore the facts which it did not explain. But life has not the simple unitariness which it demands.

In the first place, we are not entitled to regard the struggle for food and the struggle for existence as identical. The two may conflict: a hungry animal faces dangers which in other conditions it would shun. Neither do these two exhaust the catalogue of desires. Even in the lower organisms, there are, as Darwin has shown, two other motor forces at work. There is the instinct of sex, which may conflict with other impulses. There is also the delight in beauty. This last case is specially important, as it points so directly to the presence of other factors than those which conduce to the preservation of the animal. The beauty of the male bird, *e.g.*, is in the eye of the female, and neither to male nor female does it bring any advantage. In fact, the male may develop its powers of

gratifying the female's æsthetic sense, as Darwin has shown, at the cost of injury to the species.

Further, when it is stated that the activities pursued as means become ends, the utilitarian principle is again departed from. For it is implied that the activities thus practised are carried beyond the limits which utility prescribes: the independent pleasure which they yield is an end in itself. But that is to give them an importance very different from that assigned them while they are regarded as subservient to something beyond them. A revolution is wrought in conduct: there is not one only end; there is a variety of ends. The centre of gravity in life has shifted. The change may go so far that that which was originally the end may become the means. Courageous deeds may have originated with the struggle for food. Now food may be sought that there may be strength for noble deeds. Is it not a matter of history that the *Vivo ut edam* has in large measure changed into the *Edo ut vivam*? The æsthetic development, already referred to, is the most striking illustration of this principle. The senses are teleological; eye and ear are useful; but it is by no reference to the struggle for existence that the enjoyment of sonatas and studies in colors is to be explained. The so-called practical man is justified in his scoffs at such uselessness.

Again, there may be activities which have not their source in the useful at all. The nerve-centres when stimulated must liberate their energy in action of some kind, but the action may be a waste of energy, so far as the future welfare of the organism is concerned. Random movements, some at least of the expressions of the emotions, are of this meaningless, useless character, and when such elements once find a place, they in turn react upon and modify that which was in its origin directly useful.

The truth is that the activities of organic beings are not at any stage necessarily utilitarian. Nature furnishes the organism with many members, useful and useless. In the struggle for existence the non-utilitarian have tended to be eliminated. The elimination has been complete in proportion to the fierceness of the struggle. Blessed are those organisms

which are so adapted to the conditions of the struggle, that no part of their energy is wasted. For the time, the struggle is nature's expedient for shifting such organisms from the less economical. But apart from the struggle, there is no reason why the organism should show this economy. Piano-playing may be out of place on the battle-field, but may be a pleasant employment when there is a truce in the conflict. It is impossible to state the functions of the organism or the ideals of life in terms of economy in the struggle for existence.

There are thus actions that are useful and actions that are useless. After what has been said on the possibility of finding unity of type in all actions, it may not be difficult to see how, so far as teleology is concerned, the two are one. In both there is liberation of energy. In the useful action the energy liberated secures directly or indirectly its own renewal. Yet this regeneration of energy, so to name it, is contingent; though nature gives the prize in the conflict to those organisms in whose constitution she has exhibited it, it is not primarily essential to, or designed by them.

Our investigations have put us in a position to state the ideal of life. We cannot restrict the virtues to the useful, as usefulness is generally estimated. We may not say that the final end of all action is the getting of food, and the preservation of life. To do so is to put an incubus on morality. The useful is only a part of the good; it is only a part of the pleasant. Our nature expands in many varieties of activity, and the moral ideal is the development of all our faculties, or if we, by the power of sympathy, include others with ourselves, it is the development of the faculties of humanity, the filling of the world with joy.

From this point of view, it can be seen that it is the function of the ethical rule to give a method for reaching the good of life. Primarily, the good is extraneous to the law; later, the mere obedience may become an end in itself, as any means may become an end: Virtue for virtue's sake. But still this particular rule is empirical, and with the increasing complexity of life, new methods must

be discovered, and the old discarded. This work of remodeling and adding to the laws of life is as delicate as it is serious. The earnest days which Carlyle applauds so stormily, were days when life resolved itself into a fairly simple struggle for existence, and the requisites for success were physical vigor allied with the more elementary virtues. But the conflict slackens, and then there is a leisure which is not incompatible with the retention of the good things of life. Then the grossest forms of vice arise, but then also there is opportunity for a refinement compared with which the condition of the past age seems coarse and barbarous. It is then that the moralist has one of his most delicate tasks. Yet he is surely wise if he regards the statutes of men as empirical, and, while reverencing the past, reverences yet more truth and the fullness of nature.

A true Ethic would thus put for the ideal of man the development of his faculties ; only, it does not take these as static ; it teaches that the perfection at which he aims is larger than he can now understand. New faculties are emerging ; new relations are being entered into ; life bursts all bonds. Man's present powers and all those whose potency now lies in his spirit, are to be partakers of a completer satisfaction than the world has known. The development of each faculty is limited only by its own conditions and the demands of all the others. The ideal of life, we can say, though with a meaning different from Mr. Spencer's, is its fulness.

Something more positive should be added on the relation of ideas to practical life. Nothing has been said to belittle their importance. It is largely in proportion as the emotions have had reason for their guardian, that they have bloomed into happiness. Nor is this the only good in ideas. As the intellect develops, ideas are deemed valuable for their own sakes : for many, truth is the highest possession. And the movement of ideas is often independent of any desire for satisfaction. It does not indeed always have this independence ; there is a peculiar pleasure connected with the solution of problems, and the acquisition of truth. And when there is a choice between the intellectual life and other goods, it is in

that pleasure, blended, it may be, with the primal joys referred to above, that the source of the decision in favor of such a life is to be found.

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THE ALTRUISTIC IMPULSE IN MAN AND ANIMALS.

It often happens that the mind, imbued with and dominated by a familiar theory, sees in nature things that do not exist. The projected reflection of dominant ideas assumes the aspect of real existence. And while man has the penetrating vision and shows the interest of a lover of nature for these products of his mind, which can properly be called nothing more than hallucinations, he does not even perceive the real facts which seem to contradict his dogmas, or, if he observes them, he gives them a minimum importance, and, by a process of transformation, psychologically explicable, he harmonizes them with the aspiration of his soul, he sees them as interpreted by his prejudices. Thus he sees everywhere only proofs of his own thesis, where an impartial mind can perceive only things which are indifferent if not contrary to his theory. In this case, freedom of mind disappears. The captive of his own thoughts, man seems condemned to contemplate himself eternally in the outward projection of his inner world, which he imposes upon everything and which he finds always between his mind and objective reality.

We have in Don Quixote an example both celebrated and clear, because it is magnified to the pathological stage of the phenomenon. But who can determine the point at which, upon a mistaken path, the nature of the healthy man is clearly separated from that of the sick man? The difference is one of degree and the ascent is by imperceptible gradations. When we study a phenomenon of mental peculiarity in its clearly marked form, we are able to understand more easily what